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ARMED SERVICES-CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION-THE END OF THE ROAD*
Exemption of certain groups and their members from com-
batant military service is not new. In fact, since the Revolu-
tionary War, the United States has exempted persons whose
religious tenets will not permit fighting.1 At the same time the
federal government has never excused from military service
those whose abhorrence of fighting and war is based upon
purely personal reasons.2 Between these two extremes lies a
large, nebulous group whose members include those whose re-
ligion does not forbid fighting, those whose non-combative per-
suasions are only influenced by religious beliefs, and those whose
objections stem from deeply held imperatives of conscience or
ethics that play the same part in the objector's life as does
religion in the lives of others.
It is this large middle group that has caused the most prob-
lems in the courts' struggles to construe the conscientious ob-
jector statutes properly through the years. It is not necessary to
review these struggles here.3 They have recently culminated,
however, in the well-publicized case of Welsh v. United States.4
This case, based largely on the prior case of United States v.
Seeger,5 drew attention because of the Court's expansion of the
Seeger test to the test formulated in Welsh which excluded
all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no
rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a
part of an instrument of war.6
The Court's perfunctory adherence to the requirement that the
objection be based upon "religious training and belief" is sig-
nificant, for it may herald the last time that even perfunctory
adherence is observed.
Inasmuch as Welsh is founded upon Seeger, it should be use-
ful to review the decision in that case. This is not to indulge in
* Welsh v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970).
1. Osberger, The Three Eras of the Conscientious Objector, 34 U. GIN.
L. R.Iv. 487 (1965).
2. Id.
3. A good review is provided by Osberger, supra note 1.
4. 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970).
5. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
6. Welsh v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1970).
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a careful analysis of Seeger, for that has already been well
doneJ but rather to illustrate the background which led to the
decision in Welsh. In Seeger, three cases were consolidated for
argument even though each involved different facts and circum-
stances." The parties, convicted for refusal to submit for induc-
7. An excellent analysis may be found in Rabin, When is a Religious Belief
Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise 51 CoR-
nu.L L.Q. 231 (1966).
8. The three cases were United States v. Seeger, 326 F2d 846 (2d Cir.
1964); United States v. Jakobson, 325 F2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963); Peter v.
United States, 324 F2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963). The facts in each were as follows:
1. Seeger. Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the South
ern District of New York of having refused to submit to induction
in the armed forces. He was originally classified 1-A in 1953 by
his local board, but this classification was changed in 1955 to 2-S
(student) and he remained in this status until 1958 when he was
reclassified 1-A. He first claimed exemption as a conscientious ob-
jector in 1957 after successive annual renewals of his student clas-
sification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the printed Selective
Service System form, he declared that he was conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his"religious" belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to
his belief in a Supreme Being open, "rather than answer 'yes' or
'no'"; that his "skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God" did
"not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever"; that
his was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their
own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed." He cited
such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his
ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity "without belief in
God, except in the remotest sense." His belief was found to be
sincere, honest, and made in good faith; and his conscientious ob-
jection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of
which included research in religious and cultural fields. Seeger's
claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a
"belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" as required by § 6(j)
of the Act. He was convicted and the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section dis-
tinguished "between internally derived and externally compelled
beliefs" and was, therefore, an "impermissible classification" under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2. Jakobson. Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern District
of New York on a charge of refusing to submit to induction.
Jakobson was originally classified 1-A in 1953 and intermittently
enjoyed a student classification until 1956. It was not until April
1958 that he made claim to noncombatant classification (1-A-O)
as a conscientious objector. He stated on the Selective Service
System form that he believed in a "Supreme Being" who was
"Creator of Man" in the sense of being "ultimately responsible
for the existence of" man and who was "the Supreme Reality" of
which "the existence of man is the result." (Emphasis in the
original.) He explained that his religious and social thinking had
developed after much meditation and thought. He had concluded
that man must be "partly spiritual" and, therefore, "partly akin to
the Supreme Reality"; and that his "most important religious law"
was that "no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another man's
life as a means to any other end . . . ." In December 1958 he
requested a 1-0 classification since he felt that participation in any
form of military service would involve him in "too many situations
and relationships that would be a strain on [his] conscience that
1970]
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tion, raised a constitutional attack upon section 6 (j) of the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act which then provided
in part:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to
require any person to be subject to combatant training
and service in the armed forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form. Religious training and belief in this connection
means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from
[he felt he] must avoid." He submitted a long memorandum of
"notes on religion" in which he defined religion as the "sum and
essence of one's basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of
human existence," (emphasis in the original) ; he said that he be-
lieved in "Godness" which was "the Ultimate Cause for the fact
of the Being of the Universe"; that to deny its existence would but
deny the existence of the universe because "anything that Is, has
an Ultimate Cause for its Being." There was a relationship To
Godness, he stated, in two directions, i.e., "vertically, towards God-
ness directly," and "horizontally, towards Godness through Mankind
and the World." He accepted the latter one. The Board classified
him I-A-O and Jakobson appealed. The hearing officer found that
the claim was based upon a personal moral code and that he was
not sincere in his claim. The Appeal Board classified him 1-A. It
did not indicate upon what ground it based its decision, i.e., insin-
cerity or a conclusion that his belief was only a personal moral code.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim came within
the requirements of § 6(j). Because it could not determine whether
the Appeal Board had found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come
within the statutory definition, or whether it had concluded that he
lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the indictment.
3. Peter. Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern Dis-
trict of California on a charge of refusing to submit to induction.
In his Selective Service System form he stated that he was not a
member of a religious sect or organization .... [h]e hedged the
question as to his belief in a Supreme Being by saying that it
depended on the definition and ... that he felt it a violation of
his moral code to take human life and that he considered this belief
superior to his obligation to the state. As to whether his conviction
was religious, he quoted with approval Reverend John Haynes
Holmes' definition of religion as "the consciousness of some power
manifest in nature which helps man in the ordering of his life in
harmony with its demands . .. [; it] is the supreme expression of
human nature; it is man thinking his highest, feeling his deepest
and living his best." The source of his conviction he attributed to
reading and meditation "in our democratic American culture, with
its values derived from the western religious and philosophical tra-
dition." Ibid. As to his belief in a Supreme Being, Peter stated
that he supposed "you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being
or God. These just do not happen to be the words I me." In 1959
he was classified I-A, although there was no evidence in the record
that he was not sincere in his beliefs. After his conviction for
failure to report for induction the Court of Appeals, assuming
arguendo that he was sincere, affirmed.
380 U.S. 163, 166-169 (1965).
[ ol. 22
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any human relation, but does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code.9
The constitutional attack was brought under the first amend-
ment's establishment and free exercise clauses; the defendants
maintained (1) that section 6(j) does not exempt non-religious
conscientious objectors and (2) that it discriminates between
different forms of religious expression in violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Two of the parties also
claimed that their beliefs came within the meaning of the
section.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court sidestepped the con-
stitutional attack and instead concentrated on giving section
6(j) the widest possible application. In its own words, the Court
found the question of the case to be: "Does the term 'Supreme
Being' as used in section 6(j) mean the orthodox God or the
broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, 'to which all else
is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately depend-
ent?' ""0o Searching for the answer, the Court pointed out that
there were over 250 sects in our land with widely divergent
tenets and concepts of deity and thus illustrated the difficulty
in correctly interpreting the intent of Congress in its use of the
phrase "Supreme Being".
The Court considered itself fortunate, however, in having two
important guidelines to interpretation. First, Congress had
adopted the words of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v.
Macintoshll--"The essence of religion is belief in a relation to
God involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation,"'12-but had substituted "Supreme Being" for "God."
The change was significant, said the Court, for Congress had
deliberately broadened its statutory definition. Further, Con-
gress had not elaborated on the form or nature of this higher
authority and had thereby indicated its awareness of the broad
range of beliefs the authority could encompass.
The second guideline was the Senate Report on the bill which
stated that section 6(j) was intended to re-enact "substantially
the same provisions as were found" in the 1940 Act.13 The Court
explained:
9. 62 Stat 612 (1958), as amnended 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1967).
10. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965).
11. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
12. Id. at 633.
13. 380 U.S. at 176.
1970]
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Under the 1940 Act it was necessary only to have a con-
viction based upon religious training and belief; we
believe that is all that is required here. Within that
phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which
are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these
words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies
in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled
by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the ex-
emption comes within the statutory definition.
14
The Court also stated that the section continued the congres-
sional policy of providing exemption from military service for
those whose opposition is based on grounds that can fairly be
said to be "religious," and, "we believe this construction em-
braces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern re-
ligious community."'1'
The Court finally specified that the claim of the registrant
that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be
given great weight and that the validity of what he believes
cannot be questioned. The duty of the local boards and the
courts, it said, was to decide whether the beliefs professed were
sincerely held and whether they were, in the objector's own
scheme of things, religious.
The Court's approach to Seeger is made quite clear by Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion. Justice Douglas said that, if the
language of section 6(j) were construed differently from the
interpretation given by the Court, the section would certainly
fall to the constitutional attack. Any other construction would
allow those who held one religious faith rather than another to
be subjected to penalties in violation of the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. Further, such a construction would also
result in a denial of equal protection by preferring some re-
ligions over others in contravention of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. 16 Justice Douglas then certified that
the Court had gone to great pains and indulged in a little judi-
cial repair work in construing the section broadly enough to
avoid violation of any constructional guarantees, but he said
that the Court had not been overly broad in its interpretation
14. Id.
15. Id. at 180.
16. Justice Douglas cites Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) in support of these statements.
[Vol. 22
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and that, even if it had, in a more extreme case than Seeger, the
Court had said that "the words of a statute may be strained 'in
the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt.' ,,17
In WesA the Supreme Court reiterated its decision in Seeger,
but also subtly expanded the test to include those whose sincere,
deeply held objections were only remotely religious, if at all.'8
The Court compared the two cases very closely in every re-
spect, 9 but, in explaining its previous decision, the Court seemed
17. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953).
18. An amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act in
1967, subsequent to the decision in Seeger, deleted "Supreme Being" but
retained the remainder of the religious requirements. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j)
(1967).
19. The Court stated:
The controlling facts in this case are strikingly similar to those in
Seeger. Both Seeger and Welsh were brought up in religious homes
and attended church in their childhood, but in neither case was this
church one which taught its members not to engage in war at any
time for any reason. Neither Seeger nor Welsh continued his child-
hood religious ties into his young manhood, and neither belonged to
any religious group or adhered to the teaching of any organized
religion during the period of his involvement with the Selective
Service System. At the time of their registration for the draft,
neither had yet come to accept pacifist principles. Their views on
war developed only in subsequent years, but when their ideas did
fully mature both made application with their local draft boards for
conscientious objector exemptions from military service under
section 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act ....
In filling out their exemption applications both Seeger and
Welsh were unable to sign the statement which, as printed in the
Selective Form, stated "I am, by reason of my religious training
and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form." Seeger could sign only after striking the words "training
and" putting quotations around the word "religious." Welsh could
sign only after striking the words "religious training and." On
those same applications, neither could definitely affirm or deny
that he believed in a "Supreme Being," both stating that they pre-
ferred to leave the question open. But both Seeger and Welsh
affirmed on those applications that they held deep conscientious
scruples against taking part in wars where people were killed. Both
strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, unethical, and
immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take part in such
an evil practice. Their objection to participating in war in any form
could not be said to come from a "still, soft voice of conscience";
rather, for them that voice was so loud and insistent that both men
preferred to go to jail rather than serve in the Armed Forces.
There was never any question about the sincerity and depth of
Seeger's convictions as a conscientious objector, and the same is
true of Welsh. In this regard the Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he
government concedes that [Welsh's] beliefs are held with the
strength of more traditional religious convictions." 404 F.2d, at
1081. But in both cases the Selective Service System concluded
that the beliefs of these men were in some sense insufficiently
"religious" to qualify them for conscientious objector exemptions
under the terms of Section 6(j). Seeger's conscientious objector
claim was denied "solely because it was not based upon a 'belief in
1970]
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to imply that it had actually meant more than it had said in
Seeger. The Court restated that whether the objector's beliefs
were, in his own scheme of things, religious was still the central
consideration and specified that the test for this consideration
was to be whether the beliefs play the role of a religion or func-
tion as a religion in the objector's life. The Court went on to say:
What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's con-
scientious objection to all war to be "religious" within
the meaning of section 6(j) is that this opposition to
war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or re-
ligious beliefs about what is right or wrong and that
these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional
religious convictions. ... If an individual deeply and
sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethical or moral
in source and content but which nevertheless impose
upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from partici-
pating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly
occupy in the life of that individual 'a place parallel to
that filled by God' in traditionally religious persons.
Because his beliefs function as a religion in his life,
such an individual is as much entitled to a "religious"
conscientious objector exemption under section 6(j) as
is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to
war from traditional religious convictions.
20
The result of this interpretation is a new test:
That section [6(j)] exempts from military service all
those whose consciences spurred by deeply held moral,
ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or
peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an
instrument of war.
21
The Court has clearly moved forward here. From convictions
based upon religious training and belief (which includes "all
sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being,
or upon a faith"22 ) the Court has moved to "deeply held moral,
a relation to a Supreme Being' as required by Section 6(j) of the
Act." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 167 (1965), while
Welsh was denied the exemption because his Appeal Board and the
Department of Justice hearing officer "could find no religious basis
for the registrant's belief, opinions, and convictions." App., at 52.
Both Seeger and Welsh subsequently refused to submit to induc-
tion into the military and both were convicted of that offense.
90 S. Ct. 1792, 1794 (1970).
20. 90 S. Ct. at 1796 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1798.
22. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
[Vol. 22
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ethical or religious beliefs." 23 Shifting from a belief which occu-
pies a place parallel to that filled by God in others, the Court
now requires a belief which is held with the strength of tradi-
tional convictions. And from a concern with construing the
statute broadly enough to include all unorthodox and personal
religious variations, the Court has shifted to a concern with all
beliefs, except political, if sincerely and deeply held. At best, it
seems that the Court has strained the bounds of permissible
statutory construction to its limits in an attempt to save the
section from constitutional attack. At worst, the Court seems
deliberately to ignore the restrictions on exemption imposed by
the Congress. In any case, it appears that the Court has re-
moved, to a large extent, the religious requirement of the
conscientious objector exemption.
The Court's move was also very controversial. Justice Harlan
wrote a concurring opinion in which he renounced his concur-
rence in Seeger. There are limits, he said, to the liberties which
may be taken in the name of the doctrine of construing federal
statutes in order to avoid possible constitutional infirmities, and
those limits were exceeded in Seeger and Welsh. As a result, the
Justice said that he was unable to avoid facing the constitutional
issue that Welsh presented. As he saw the Court's decision:
Today the Court makes explicit its total elimination of
the statutorily required religious content for a con-
scientious objector exemption. The Court now says: "If
an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which
are purely ethieaZ or moral in source and content but
which nevertheless impose on him a duty of conscience
to refrain from participating in any war at any time,"
he qualifies for a Section 6(j) exemption.24
Justice Harlan complained that it was Congress' will that must
be determined; that it was one thing to construe statutes in
order to adapt them to circumstances uncontemplated by Con-
gress, but something entirely different to construe them to
change expressed policy. He determined that the only construc-
tion of section 6(j) which was consistent with the legislative
history was the "natural" one which drew a distinction between
theistic and nontheistic religions and which, therefore, ran into
constitutional difficulties.
23. Welsh, 90 S. Ct. at 1798 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 1799.
1970]
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Justice Harlan said that the constitutional question which
must be faced was whether a statute that defers to the objector's
conscience only when his beliefs derive from a theistic religious
foundation was within the power of Congress. He pointed out
that Congress could eliminate all exemptions for conscientious
objectors and thus pursue a neutral course which, in his view,
would not violate the free exercise clause. But having chosen to
exempt conscientious objectors, Congress could not distinguish
between theistic and non-theistic beliefs on the one hand, and
secular beliefs on the other without offending the establishment
clause of the first amendment.25 This neutrality principle is the
key to conforming with the requirements of the first amend-
ment, but the statute at hand is not neutral:
It not only accords a preference to the "religious" but
disadvantages adherents of religions that do not wor-
ship a Supreme Being.
20
Therefore, Justice Harlan decided that the statute was defective
and that the conviction of Welsh must be reversed.
The Justice continued, however, by explaining that there were
two ways to cure a statute defective because of under-inclusion:
a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits
not be applied, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to
include those excluded. So, while dissatisfied with the liberties
taken by the Court in construing the section, Justice Harlan
decided to concur in the opinion of the Court:
When a policy has roots so deeply embedded in history,
there is a compelling reason for a court to hazard the
necessary statutory repairs if they can be made within
the administrative framework of the statute and with-
out impairing other legislative goals, even though they
entail, not simply eliminating an offending section but
rather building upon it. Thus, I am prepared to accept
the Court's conscientious objector test, not as a reflec-
tion of Congressional statutory intent but as patchwork
of judicial making that cures the defect of under-inclu-
sion in section 6(j) and can be administered by local
boards in the usual course of business.
27
It is apparent that, barring legislative interference, the re-
ligious base for the conscientious objector status is doomed if
25. Justice Harlan cites Wat: v. Tax Comm'n., 90 S. Ct., 1409 (1970).
26. 90 S. Ct. at 1805.
27. Id. at 1810.
[Vol. 22
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indeed it still exists. The long road leading to exemption of all
those conscientiously opposed to war for any reason appears to
be reaching its end. Even objections based on political beliefs
may soon be cause for exemption. Already a United States Dis-
trict Court has held that a defendant could not be convicted for
refusing induction because of a conscientious objection to the
Vietnam conflict. The court in that case, Lnited States ',. Sis-
son,2 8 based its opinion on what it understood to be Sisson's
rights of conscience as a nonreligious objector to the Vietnam
War, but not wars in general, under the free exercise and estab-
lishment clauses of the first amendment and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution. The court's
conclusion was that the Constitution prohibited requiring Sisson
to enter combat in Vietnam because "as a sincerely conscientious
man," Sisson's interest in not killing in Vietnam outweighed
"the country's present need for him to be so employed."29 The
Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,30 but
did grant certiorari in two cases to examine the "selective ob-
jector" legal theory of the district court in Sisson.31
Granting an exemption for political beliefs is not a natural
expansion of the decisions in Seeger and Wesh. First, to exempt
persons from performance of the duties of citizenship on the
basis of political beliefs would be to open a virtual Pandora's
box of difficulties in the administration of a national govern-
ment, particularly in the field of national security. Second, an
irate legislature would not stand for such a blatant contradiction
of its will. And third, political beliefs are manifestly not of the
same character as moral or religious beliefs. Our natural law
background has left with us the lingering belief that there is a
higher authority than the state and that in the final analysis, it
is the imperative of this authority which must be obeyed. A
moral, ethical, or religious authority has frequently been accept-
able in this context, but a political authority, as the temporal
creation of man, has been so only infrequently. And so it is sub-
mitted that the conscientious objector exemption has reached the
end of its road, brought there by a combination of the principles
of the old natural law, as expressed at Nuremburg and else-
28. 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
29. Id. at 910.
30. United States v. Sisson, 90 S. Ct. 2117 (1970).
31. Id. at 2120 n.1. The cases are Gillette v. United States, No. 85 (U.S.,
February 11, 1970); and Negre v. Larsen, No. 325 (U.S., February 5, 1970).
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where, and modern crises, reflecting the new natural law view-
point:
The legislator has only a fragmentary consciousness of
this [new natural] law; he translates it by the rules
which he prescribes. When the question is one of fixing
the meaning of those rules, where ought we to search?
Manifestly at their source; that is to say, in the exi-
gencies of social life. There resides the strongest prob-
ability of discovering the sense of the law. In the same
way when the question is one of supplying the gaps in
the law, it is not of logical deductions, it is rather of
social needs, that we are to ask the solution.
3 2
ROBERT B. PEARLMAN
32. B. CAiRozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JuDICrAL PRocass 121 (1921), quoting
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